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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the impact of a country-crisis in a Free Trade Area (FTA) 
bloc, and how it affected its Mercosur neighbours. This thesis contains a study 
of economic integration provided by the creation of Mercosur in March 26th of 
1991. Also, a study of relative prices will be made by analysing what happened 
with the integration on Mercosur after the crisis. Thus, the purpose of this 
thesis is to analyze price change after the creation of Mercosur, and see what 
happened after the Argentinian crisis by using disaggregated data on consumer 
prices, in order to determine variability in prices of similar goods across the 
Mercosur. By using the Law of One Price (LOP) analysis, it was possible to 
fathom that after the Mercosur creation a convergence in prices happened due 
to the Argentinian crisis. 
Key words: Free Trade Area, Relative Prices, Economic Integration, Country-
crisis Impact, Law of One Price (LOP). 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The Common Market of the South, (Mercado Comun del Sur – Mercosur), is a 
South American answer to the new world reality which points towards 
regionalisation in terms of consolidated economic blocs, and globalisation, 
expressed through an increasing internationalisation of national economies. 
The very first antecedents of Latin American integration are from the sixties, 
when the Latin American Association of Free Trade (Associacion Latino 
Americana de Livre Comércio – ALALC) was created. This was later 
transformed into the Latin American Association of Development and 
Integration (Associacion Latino Americana de Desenvolvimiento e Integracion 
– ALADI) in 1980. Both were inspired by the precepts established by the Latin 
American Economy Commission (Comision Economica Para America Latina – 
CEPAL) that recommended expanding the regional market and elaborating a 
common industrialization strategy. This study was based on the model of 
import substitution, closed markets and the active role of the government in 
productive activities, and even though it met with many difficulties in terms of 
Latin American Integration it did advance the mutual cooperation to some 
extent. 
According to Espiell (1991), some of the major factors hindering the 
integration process were the strong movements related to nationalist ideologies, 
the authoritarianism prevailing on most of the continent, national development 
strategies with no room for integration, the great diversity of national realities 
as far as social, economical and political institutions are concerned, and the 
foreign debt of practically all the Latin American countries in the eighties. 
The integration managed to provide a growth in interregional trade in the 
sixties and seventies, but in the eighties foreign debt and the world crisis 
slowed this down. The industrialization and export of manufactured products, 
especially by the larger countries of Latin America, may largely be considered 
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a result produced by the import substitution policy inspired by CEPAL and 
backed up by ALALC/ALADI. 
In 1986, an agreement called the Integration and Economic Cooperation 
Program (Programa de Integracion e Coperacion Economica – PICE) was 
signed by Brazil and Argentina, following recent tendencies within ALADI of 
signing bilateral agreements, and considering the need for strengthening their 
new democratic governments and economic development. 
This new agreement (PICE) became a reality after certain controversies 
between the two countries were solved in the late seventies, such as the rights 
to use the Paraná River hydroelectric resources, the cooperation in the strategic 
energy sector and the change, in both countries, towards a democratic 
government. 
The PICE agreement produced a development proposal which was not based 
solely on Trade, but which would also allow for cooperation, collaboration and 
complementation in the economy of the two countries. It was based on 
principles of progression, flexibility, balance and symmetry, thus allowing the 
productive sectors to gradually adapt to the new situation of a partial and 
selective opening of the market, and implementing projects compatible with the 
economic situation of each country. 
According to Espiell, the main proposals of PICE were aimed at: 
- Forming a development alternative based on an ample cooperation 
and economic integration program. 
- Favouring an inter-industrial integration through an exchange of 
partly processed raw material, exceeding the limits which the 
recession had imposed, upon each economy. 
- Strengthening the commercial relationships between the two 
economies. 
- Creating protocols for scientific, technological and cultural 
collaboration. 
Despite the increase in the trade between Brazil and Argentina, the program 
became less dynamic from 1988 onwards as a result of the macroeconomic 
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instability of both countries suffering from inflation, recession and strong 
oscillations in their respective currencies. Thus, in that same year an important 
step was taken in order to proceed with the bilateral integration: the signing of 
the integration treaty through which Mercosur would be formed within the 
following ten years. 
The new governments (Menem in Argentina) and (Collor in Brazil) introduced 
a significant change in the treaty in 1990, signing the Buenos Aires Agreement 
which determined that Mercosur should be established by December 31, 1994. 
It also introduced a mechanism, which progressively reduced tariffs so as to 
liberalize the bilateral trade. 
While, on the one hand, the anticipated integration time had been drastically 
reduced, the governments of the two countries allowed trade to take control of 
the process so that the commercial aspects became priority, and the common 
development alternatives became secondary concerns. 
Paraguay and Uruguay finally decided to join Brazil and Argentina and signed 
the Asunción Treaty on March 26, 1991, which contained the same precepts as 
the Buenos Aires Agreement. 
The Treaty defined a “transition period”, i.e. the time between the moment it 
was signed and December 31, 1994, during which the members would 
implement an intra-Mercosur tariff reduction program.  They would also 
negotiate a common external rate together with all the usual instruments of 
common trade policy to be applied from January 1, 1995 (the tariff reduction 
program reduced the rates within Mercosur to zero, and was an annex to the 
Treaty itself; the reduction to occur in bi-annual quotas which should be 
respected by all members without exception). 
As established in the Treaty of Asuncion, the four member countries agreed to 
create an institutional structure for Mercosur by signing a protocol 
modifying/complementing the treaty. This protocol was signed at the end of the 
transition period, on December 17, 1994, in the Brazilian City of Ouro Preto, 
state of Minas Gerais. 
The importance of this protocol is due primarily to the following aspects:  
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- Establishment of the legal character of Mercosur, providing it with 
external representation as also the ability to negotiate with third 
countries or other group of countries 
- Creation of a framework for the institutional structure of 
Mercosur, defining its main executive and decision-making 
boards. The definitive structure would be gradually defined only in 
the medium term.  
By approving the Common External Tariff, the Common Market Council has 
given a new political dimension to the integration process, permitting the end 
of the transition process and changing the status of the integration process to a 
Customs Union. 
CEPAL, ALALC, ALADI and Mercosur gradually brought financial 
integration, even although it was not completely autonomous, of obtaining and 
applying resources in the integrated countries. Some steps were taken to 
promote integration. However, still quite a lot must be done. As an example, 
some barriers protecting regional industries must be removed, and the 
differences in industrial tariffs and financial application through Mercosur must 
be levelled out. A good aspect of Mercosur is the increase of companies’ direct 
investments.  
On the other hand, the banking integration had a huge advance despite the 
limitations imposed by existing barriers, especially in Brazil. This process has 
been intensified, in spite of a lot of work, which still has to be done, such as the 
creation of a common legislation to financial institutions. A Statement of 
Principles recommended in 1988 by the International Committee of Banking 
Regulations and Supervisory Practices - “The Basel Committee” created a 
treaty that established a minimum demand to banking capitalisations which was 
a positive factor, despite the fact that it wasn’t done in a homogeneous way. 
Therefore, important questions must be solved and these countries governments 
must keep working on the progress of the integration. A lot of other matters 
divert attention away from the government, i.e., banking protection, non-
declared money and the access to different financial market segments in these 
countries. 
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One of the financial integration aspects that had few improvements was 
application on the capital market. This matter can be explained by the fact that 
companies try to get capital resources in developed countries. These markets 
have shown a better attraction than internal markets. They have a better 
availability and less costs, while the short level of cash of Mercosur countries 
makes money scarce and with a higher cost. The banking cash scarcity in these 
countries makes them receptors of external money, making the competition by 
these resources to increase. An important factor that affects the financial 
integration negatively is the differences in financial tariffs, which are very high 
in Brazil in comparison to Mercosur partners. 
By analysing these difficulties, and taking into consideration the complexity of 
the actual picture of the financial integration, it is not possible to say if 
Mercosur will bring gains, losses or conflicts to its partners. However, by 
analysing some facts, as for example trade growth and investments between 
countries, we may say that Mercosur is positive. It is known that in a medium 
or long perspective, by taking off protectionism barriers and other impediments 
to integration we are contributing to the creation of an environment capable to 
bring benefits to the economy, society and culture. A huge advantage, if we 
compare old protectionist bureaucratic systems.  
However, Mercosur has recently been highly impacted by the The Argentinian 
crisis. This free trade bloc that once was an example to NAFTA is now still 
working but maybe not as well as before. The trade between countries probably 
decreased and these changes in Mercosur caused relative prices changes, as 
shown in Chapter 6. The Argentinian crisis had also a huge impact on the 
worldwide economy, due to the fact that a lot of foreign investment was in the 
country and a lot of multinational companies suffered by this crisis. As an 
example, we have the Spanish Bank Santander that had a huge loss and closed 
it doors in Argentina.  
We may say that the situation in Latin America is very delicate. Uruguay is 
already paying the price for a close regional tie. Devaluation in Brazil and 
recession in Argentina have forced a contraction in their neighbour’s GDP.  
The recession has been complicated by a bank crisis directly linked with the 
country's erstwhile status as a safe dollar haven for wealthy Argentines. The 
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collapse in Argentina, on which Uruguay depended for most of its tourism, 
construction activity and dollar deposits seemed to be the final straw. After the 
worst tourist season in living memory, the country is already braced for another 
summer of empty beaches and depressed commercial activity. Juan Pedro 
Bordaberry, the tourism minister says he is looking to Brazil, Chile and the US 
to help make up for a predicted 50 % decline in Argentine visitors. 
However, the more predictable and visible repercussions of the Argentine crisis 
look mild beside the crisis uncorked by the collapse of confidence in 
Uruguayan banks. In February, the central bank was forced to rescue the 
Uruguayan operation of Banco de Galicia.  
Brazil still suffers the impact of the Argentinian crisis. However, in spite of its 
effort on signalling abroad during the devaluation of the Argentina peso that 
Brazil’s economy was healthy by paying debt before the exercise date, the 
external investor is still looking to Brazil with a lot of caution.  
In Paraguay, despite the Argentine crisis, the economy grew 2.5% in 2001 after 
three years of sluggish economic growth. The government also significantly 
reduced the fiscal deficit in 2001. Prudent economic policies in recent years 
have helped the country keep inflation in single digits and maintain a 
comfortable level of international reserves. The current administration has to 
continue with the structural reform agenda in order to improve productivity and 
boost economic growth. 
 
1.2 Argentina Crisis Overview. 
According to Cibils, Weisbrot and Debugnai (2002) the IMF is still insisting 
that “failures in fiscal policy constitute the root of the current Argentinian 
crisis”, and recommending fiscal and monetary austerity as a means of reviving 
investor confidence and thereby stimulating economic recovery. But this 
approach has failed for more than four years, as the economy remains mired in 
a depression, with a loss of more than 20 percent of GDP since the last business 
cycle peak in 1998. 
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Furthermore, the crisis was not caused by fiscal profligacy. The worsening of 
the central government's fiscal balance from 1993 to 2002 was not a result of 
increased government spending (other than interest payments). Moreover, there 
was a decline in government revenue due to the recession, which began in the 
third quarter of 1998. Argentina got stuck in a debt spiral in which higher 
interest rates increased the debt and the country's risk premium, which led to 
ever-higher interest rates and debt service until its default in December of 2001. 
The interest rate shocks came from outside, starting with the US Federal 
Reserve's decision to raise short-term rates in February of 1994, and kept going 
on through the Mexican, Asian, Russian, and Brazilian financial crises (1995-
1999).  
Argentina's currency board system contributed significantly to the depression, 
because economic activity was directly reduced by the large capital outflows 
during various episodes of international financial turbulence. The motivation 
for that is the peso parity against the dollar that made the peso a strong 
currency excellent to be take out during bad periods.  
It is also worth noting that the government's decision to privatise its social 
security system in 1994 had a major impact on the central government budget 
deficit. In fact, the lost revenue plus accumulated interest costs amounted to 
nearly the entire government budget deficit in 2001. In spite of all these things, 
the central government's deficit was never very large, peaking at 3.2 percent of 
GDP in 2001 (all attributable to interest payments). Much has been made of 
provincial spending, but the provincial deficits totalled 1.1 percent of GDP in 
2000 and peaked at 1.9 percent in 2001. All stated that none of this deficit 
spending was very large in the face of such a deep depression. 
This was a truly unviable system. It is difficult to imagine any fiscal policy - 
assuming it were even politically possible to cut enormous amounts of 
government spending - that could have avoided the fate of December 2001, 
given the overvalued currency, the size and growth of Argentina's debt (mostly 
denominated in foreign currency) relative to export earnings, and the free 
mobility of capital. Deficit spending did not cause the current crisis, and 
attempts to bring about an economic recovery through continued fiscal and 
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monetary austerity are not likely to be more successful in the near future than 
they have been in the past. 
The situation in Argentina is one of the worst ever. Nowadays, Argentina is 
facing one of the worst political and economic situations in history. The GDP 
has declined at a record 16.3 percent annual rate in the first quarter of 2002. 
Unemployment stands at 21.5 percent of the labour force, and real monthly 
wages have declined by 18 percent over the course of the year. Official poverty 
and indigence rates have reached record levels: 53% of Argentinians are now 
living below the official poverty line, while 25% are indigent (basic needs 
unmet). Since October 2001, 5.2 million Argentinians have fallen below the 
poverty line, while seven out of ten Argentinian children are poor today. 
While this is the worst economic crisis in Argentine history, there are a number 
of reasons to view the economy as poised for a rapid recovery, and one that can 
take place without external financing. Most importantly, Argentina is running a 
large current account and trade surplus. Primarily as a result of the devaluation, 
the export sector has vastly expanded as a share of the economy, and is 
considerably more competitive internationally (Cibils, Weisbrot and Debugnai, 
2002). 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
Many examples of crisis have happened during recent decades, i.e., the Asian, 
the Russian, and the one focused in this paper - the Argentinian crisis. 
Due to present-day globalisation, an economic crisis in a specific country may 
affect the economic integration of other countries. Many consequences may 
occur such as, for example, a decrease in traded goods, stock exchange 
variation, labour market, capital flows. 
But, one of the questions that remains in this vast topic is: What are the 
economic integration consequences to all country members of a Free Trade 
Area when one of the partners is in crisis? 
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It is expected that members of a Free Trade Area should have a high economic 
integration, and therefore, it is worth making an analysis of this. First, to 
measure if these countries really have an economic integration, and second to 
check if a crisis in a member country may affect its partners. It is important to 
know what happens with a country that joins a Free Trade Area like Mercosur, 
European Union or APEC. This question will be answered by comparing the 
degree of integration before and after the initiation of Mercosur . Part of the 
strong motivation that leads a country into joining a Free Trade Area is the 
benefit that a bigger market can provide such as a maximization of scale 
economies, competition and cheaper goods for customers. The incremental 
trade flows between country-members is a significant gain for these countries. 
But becoming integrated may make a country more vulnerable, if a partner 
becomes involved in a crisis then such country will be more susceptive to also 
having a crisis as well. 
By adopting the LOP methodology (see Chapter 3) its possible to measure if 
before Argentina crisis these countries had a convergence in prices and if these 
prices diverged after the crisis.  
 
1.4 Problem definition 
As mentioned previously, in consideration of price convergence as a tool to 
measure economic integration, when taking into consideration general data 
about Mercosur, as an example of a FTA and the Argentinian crisis 
(background). It is possible to define a problem question which is: How does a 
countries crisis affect its economic integrated FTA’s partners? Hence, this 
thesis wants to check what happened with the economic integration between 
Mercosur after the Argentinian crisis. 
1.5 Purpose of this thesis. 
Based upon the problem discussion, the purpose of this thesis is to measure the 
consequences on prices when a crisis takes place in a country that belongs to a 
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Free Trade Area Bloc, i.e., the Argentinian crisis and its impact on the 
Mercosur. 
 
1.6 Alternative Approaches and Limitations 
Some limitations are presented, in order to develop some structure for the 
analysis. These concern Mercosur and relative price analysis. 
Finding the correct approach with which to measure the effect of the 
Argentinian crisis on its FTA partners is not an easy task. It is possible to 
analyse Mercosur’s crisis by checking trade between countries, for example, 
stock exchange analysis, labour market, capital flows and relative prices. 
The trade analysis would show the volume of trade between all Mercosur’s 
countries, Firstly, to check the integration between these countries by the 
volume of trade before and after the Treaty of Asunción, when Mercosur was 
established. And then, in order to analyse the impact of the Argentinian crisis in 
these countries, an investigation of how much the trade volume had decreased.  
Another possible approach is to check the stock values of Argentina, Uruguay, 
Paraguay and Brazil, and then analyse if the stock exchange in these countries 
has a similar pattern after the consolidation of the Argentina crisis. In other 
words, to check the average rate of return in Mercosur’s stock exchange 
partners after the “event” (Argentina crisis) happened by using an OLS 
estimation. The focus could be whether there is any discernible difference in 
the stock indexes after The Argentinian crisis.  
Other aspects that could be explored are the impact of the crisis on the labour 
market, and what happened with capital flows.  
However, the aspect chosen is that of the relative prices analysis of the 
countries involved. Firstly, to analyse the integration between Mercosur’s 
countries, and secondly to analyse what happened with prices after the 
Argentinian crisis when import and other trade barriers were created to protect 
the Argentine economy. In this case a likely outcome would be: Firstly, a 
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convergence in prices after the Mercosur’s creation. This would prove the 
integration between these countries as a result of the Free Trade Area. 
Secondly, a divergence in these prices after the Argentinian crisis due to 
barriers being created to protect the economy.  
Another limitation is that all import tariffs have their own particularities and 
characteristics. At present, Mercosur is not a perfect FTA, with a lot of 
exceptions in external common tariffs, and the regional trade between regions. 
However, negotiation will begin after a restructure of Mercosur that was very 
much affected, both politically and economically, by the Argentinian crisis. 
The prevision is a total union in 2006.  
The integration process deals with a lot of political and economical factors that 
are difficult to predict. Regional investment decisions depend on 
entrepreneurial decisions that propel negotiations and possible deals. It is hard 
to measure which foreign investment will be affected by a trade policy, and a 
more stable and transparent stimulation. This integration process may build 
distinct scenarios, when taking into consideration all of the variables that may 
be of influence. 
We also have the limitation of data that does not contain all-important items 
that constitute expenditures. Consequently, even taking into account a broad 
range of diversified items, a higher quantity of items could drive the thesis to a 
more reliable result, it is important to mention how difficult it is collecting data 
concerning the Mercosur region. 
Below limitations are summarized: 
- This paper does not analyse aspects such as trade, stock exchange, 
labour market and capital flows 
- Mercosur is not a perfect FTA. 
- Content of items collected. More goods prices could drive the 
thesis to a more reliable calculation result. 
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1.7 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. In the next section the reader will be 
introduced to the theoretical and previous empirical results that are associated 
with the empirical research. Section 3 will give an overview of the theoretical 
framework. Section 4 will introduce the reader to the methodology used in the 
analysis. Results and analysis will be presented in Section 5, which will then be 
followed by the summary and concluding remarks in Section 6. 
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2. Free Trade Areas: General Case and the 
Mercosur Experience 
Below are some comments regarding a country that joins a Free Trade Area, 
and the transference of trade between this country, its partner and other 
countries. After which previous empirical results regarding Mercosur and 
economic integration will be showen. Explanations regarding trade theory may 
be seen in Appendix 1, where relative prices, the supply and demand curve as 
well as its consequences in a hypothetically integrated world are presented. 
 
2.1 Free Trade Areas - Theory 
There are some consequences for a country that takes part in a Free Trade Area, 
such as the loss of custom taxes by the government of that country. This 
happens when a country (as an example Paraguay) stops importing from an 
excluded country (like Sweden), and starts buying from a member country 
(let’s say Uruguay). 
The dislocation of trade will happen because the member country, for example 
Paraguay, gives discriminatory preference to Uruguay products. Imported 
products from any of the Mercosur countries will be free of tariffs, while 
imported products from a country outside the Free Trade Area (FTA), such as 
Sweden, will be tariffed. This discrimination on tariffs may move Paraguay 
importation from Sweden to Uruguay, and this can be analysed on the diagrams 
below, where a country (Paraguay) will be affected when a FTA is adopted. 
Let’s imagine that the cheapest Paraguayan supplier of specific goods has 
always been Sweden, at a the price of 100 guaranis. Under free trade the 
Paraguayan equilibrium point will be the point J - diagram (a), with 
importation HJ from Sweden. However, if we imagine that Paraguay have been 
keeping the tax of 50% historically, the equilibrium will be point K (instead 
point J), with an internal price of 150 guaranis and an importation volume of 
RK from Sweden (under this importation the Paraguayan government collects 
RKBC of tariffs). 
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As previously stated, if Paraguay removes import tariffs for importation from 
all countries, the new equilibrium position will be point J, and not R, with 
importation of HJ of your cheapest source (Uruguay). Also, the Paraguayan 
internal price would fall by the absolute value of the tariff (t). 
However, Paraguay does not remove the import tariff from non-Mercosur 
members. The result is that all importation from Sweden must pay tariffs. 
When arriving at the Paraguayan port, the Swedish goods have a price of 100 
guaranis, smaller than the Uruguayan price (110 guaranis) the second cheapest 
source. This is exactly what these goods cost to the Paraguayan nation as a 
whole. Nevertheless the consumer will only compare prices after these goods 
pass through the Paraguayan Custom, when the Swedish goods have a price of 
150 guaranis while the Uruguayan good with no tariffs costs 110 guaranis. To 
sum up: The Uruguayan goods are more expensive and costs more to the 
Paraguayan nation but to the consumer they are cheaper. Due to this fact, 
Paraguayans will buy from Uruguay by the price of 110 guaranis and the new 
equilibrium point will be F, and the Paraguayan participation on the Mercosur 
will reduce the price from 150 guaranis to 110 guaranis, and will stop buying 
from Sweden, giving a share of GF to Uruguay. 
The last three diagrams (b, c and d) show us the effect of Paraguay becoming a 
Mercosur member to a lot of the Paraguayan producers, consumers and 
government. Diagram b, explain what the price reduction will imply on a 
benefit to consumers (grey area). The delimitation is the demand slope. In 
diagram c, we can see the loss of Paraguayan producers in Area 3 (left of the 
supply slope). Naturally, there is a loss to the Paraguayan government, since 
these goods get inside the country free from tariffs. The Paraguayan treasury 
will lose the area RKBC on diagram a, the same as Area 4. 
It is interesting to verify the overall effect over the economic efficiency 
(diagram d). Areas 1 and 2 are liquid gains which means a higher efficiency, 
and the trade dislocation explains this. Otherwise Area 5 is a liquid loss; it is a 
efficiency loss, a result of this new situation. This is actually the Paraguayan 
cost when buying Uruguayan goods at the price of 110 guaranis, and not 
buying from Sweden (the cheapest source) at the price of 100 guaranis.  
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Thus, due to the fact that Paraguayans keep a discriminatory tariff, some of 
their importation has been changed to a more expensive source. The nation as a 
whole will have a loss equal to 5. However, this country will have a benefit 
equal to areas 1 and 2, and this is because the internal price is less distorted 
than in the previous case. In other words, with the change of the price from 150 
guaranis to 110 guaranis, Paraguay will move to a position close to a free trade 
as a whole, with the price of 100 guaranis. Also, the cheaper the price for 
country-members, the bigger the gains will be (1+2), and the smaller will be 
the loss 5.  
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(a) If we have total free trade, the 
equilibrium in the Paraguayan market 
will be the J point, by the price of 100 
guaranis with an importation of HJ, 
coming from the country with the 
smaller price (Sweden). If Paraguay 
imposes 50% of tariffs for all countries 
equally, the equilibrium will change to 
point K, costing 150 guaranis, by 
importing RK from Uruguay. However 
when Paraguay join the Mercosur, all 
country-members will not pay tariffs 
changing the Uruguay’s position from 
K to F and the price from 150 guaranis 
to 110 guaranis. This is the price that 
allows Paraguay to buy the same 
product from Uruguay – the cheaper 
Mercosur producer. Below effects to 
economic agents are stated in b, c and d 
diagrams. 
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Diagrams a, b, c and d – Consequences of the admission by a country in a Free Trade Area. 
Source: Wonnacott, Paul and Ronald Wonnacott (1994) Economia, Makron Books 
The above example is important as it shows the reader that a Free Trade Area 
(FTA) increases the integration of country-members. Paraguay, in the example, 
increased their relation with Uruguay. In the same way Argentina increased the 
integration with Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay when they joined Mercosur. The 
fact being that the volume of trade between Mercosur regions had its apogee in 
1997, a volume that could have been even higher if the Asian and Russian 
crisis had not taken place. However, even with those crises in one decade the 
volume of inter-regional exportation increased 241%. This number shows us 
the success of Mercosur that registered a 132% inter-regional growth in 
exportation while the extra-regional flow of trade increased 37%.  
The reverse is valid as economic integration decreased after the Argentina 
crisis when some barriers were again created. The higher degree of 
interdependence between countries is a key factor in explaining why a crisis in 
a country that belongs to a FTA affects it partners, and makes external investors 
suspicious of these countries. In this thesis the degree of integration will be 
explained by making a comparison of a pre-and-post Mercosur creation. 
 
Quantity
Pr
ic
e 
SK
R
100
110
150
D S
5
1 2
Pr
ic
e 
G
ua
ra
ni
s
100
110
15
100
110
 18  
2.2 Free Trade Areas – Experience in Mercosur 
An overview of previous studies regarding the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) model, and the discussion about the “trade creation versus trade 
diversion problem in the Mercosur” will now be given. The evidence aroused 
from model results favours the trade creation hypothesis. It is argued that a 
strong pro-competitive effect that increases exports in the region will occur, 
due to the fall in the price of intermediate inputs. This result is found to be 
consistent with several studies in the literature, both with those that agree with 
the trade creation hypothesis and those that have identified the fall in input 
prices as an important mechanism for economic growth in the period.  
The propagation of FTAs in the last decade is a central topic in the research 
agenda all over the world. As noted by Yeats (1997), the important question is 
whether FTA's are a stimulus to growth and investment, or just diverts trade in 
other directions, damaging the multilateral trade system. Actually, the “trade 
creation versus trade diversion” problem is pervasive in the discussions about 
trade blocs’ creation.  
The evidence about trade creation versus trade diversion controversy in the 
Mercosur integration process is mixed. Yeats (1997), in an analysis for the 
1988-1994 period, concluded that the Mercosur implementation distorted the 
trade patterns expected in the basis of efficiency and comparative advantages 
concepts. The author noted that, besides the growth in the trade between the 
member countries, the share of manufactures in total exports has grown 
compared to the 1979-1981 period, Brazil being a major player in the process. 
Although, the same was observed for the food and feeding products, the 
manufacturing sector is found to be the dynamic sector in the process. In the 
conclusions, the author points out that the regional agreement affected strongly 
the trade pattern in a negative way, for the member countries as well as for the 
other countries, considering that the trade has grown in sectors where Mercosur 
was not competitive before.  
A divergent point of view can be found in Olarreaga and Soloaga (1997). 
According to these authors, the rate of integration of Mercosur member 
countries to the world was 10 times greater in the 1991-1995 periods than in the 
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preceding decade, which would confirm that Mercosur was a success in terms 
of volume of trade. Moreover, the growth of the rate of regional integration was 
twice the rate of integration to the world, which could be explained by the fact 
that Mercosur member countries would be “natural partners” in trade 
(Olarreaga and Soloaga 1997).  
A similar point of view is expressed by Laird (1997), who argues that the rapid 
growth in the intra-Mercosur trade in the 1990-1995 period cannot be attributed 
to trade diversion only, since the trade with countries outside the bloc have also 
grown, with imports originating from countries outside the regions growing 
faster than the intra-regional trade.  
And, finally, Batholomew (1998) also shows evidence that favours the trade 
creation point of view. In a study about the Argentinian economy, the author 
shows that the share of total imports in GNP in that country were 0.6% from 
Mercosur and 2% from the Rest of the World in 1990, increasing respectively 
to 2% and 6% in 1996. This means that Argentinian imports from Mercosur, 
and from the Rest of the World, has increased at similar rates in the period, a 
result hardly consistent with the trade diversion hypothesis.  
It is important to note that all these studies where conducted at empirical level, 
and for a time period that does not comprises the full implementation of the 
Mercosur agreements, that are expected to happen in 2006. Moreover, Yeats 
(1997) has pointed out in its study that it is possible that Mercosur integration 
process has both created and diverted trade, what could improve the welfare in 
the region, if the customs unions generate a decline in prices to producers and 
consumers. 
The results obtained show us that the trade liberalization process, and the 
integration between Mercosur, would also drastically affect the export profile 
in these countries. The result cannot be attributed to the reduction in export 
taxes, since, as has previously been seen, Argentina has a neutral policy in 
relation to Brazil, while Brazil, although placing tariffs on the exports of some 
products to Argentina, did this at moderate rates. The export tariff structure in 
relation to the other countries outside Mercosur was not modified.  
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The expressive increase in exports both in Mercosur,, cannot then be attributed 
to changes in the tariff structure, as in the import case. This is an indirect effect, 
a pro-competitive effect that can be attributed to the reduction in prices of 
intermediate products, what generates a fall in production and export prices of 
both countries. It is thus a beneficial trade effect, then. And the consequence is 
that Mercosur creation resulted in an economic integration of all countries 
within this FTA. 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
In this part of the work comments about Law of One Price (LOP) and Market 
Integration & Price convergence will be made and used in the empirical 
analysis section.  
 
3.1 Law of One Price 
According to the LOP, identical goods should be sold for the same price in two 
different markets when there are no transportation costs, no transaction costs, 
no tariffs and no differential tariffs applied in either market. To make LOP 
easier to understand an example will be given. Consider the following 
information about honey sold in Argentina and Brazilian Market.  
 - Price of honey in Argentina market (PA) = 20PA 
 - Price of honey in Brazilian market (PB) = 150PB 
 - Spot exchange rate (EB/A) = 10 B/A 
The Argentinian peso (denominated here as A) price of honey sold on the 
Brazilian market can be calculated by dividing the honey price in Brazilian 
reais (denominated here as B) by the spot exchange rate as shown below.  
If the LOP held, then the peso price in Brazil should match the Argentina price. 
Since the peso price of honey is less than the peso price in Argentina, the LOP 
does not hold in this circumstance.  
   2015
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The above case gives rise to arbitrage opportunity in these countries. An 
arbitrage opportunity arises when goods bought at a lower price in one place 
can be sold for a profit at another place.  For example, if Argentinian travellers 
in Brazil recognise that identical honey is being sold for 25% less, they might 
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buy honey in Brazil and resell it in Argentina for a profit. Using basic supply 
and demand theory, the increase in demand for honey in Brazil would push the 
price of honey up, and the increase in supply of honey in the Argentina market 
would lower the price in Argentina. In the end, the price of honey in Brazil may 
rise to, say 180 reais, while the price of honey in Argentina fall to 18 pesos. At 
these new prices the law of one price holds. 
The main problem with the LOP theory is that the condition is rarely satisfied 
between countries.  
− Transportation cost and trade restrictions: One of the constraints in the 
movement of goods is transportation cost, either between the two countries 
producing the same commodities or between the buyer country and two 
producing countries. Another is the presence of tariffs. Both these factors cause 
deviation in prices. 
− Product differentiation: This is another reason, which cause prices to 
fluctuate in different countries. For example, the price of apples grown in the 
US and India maybe different due the difference in quality.  
− Perfect Information: The LOP assumes that individuals have good, even 
perfect information about the prices of goods in other markets. Armed with this 
knowledge, profit-seekers export goods to the high price markets and import 
goods from the low priced markets.  
 
3.1.1 From LOP to PPP  
The PPP theory in reality is the LOP applied in the aggregate, with a slight 
difference. The theory of LOP holds true for all identical goods sold in both 
markets.  
First, we may define the variable CBA to be the Cost of a Basket of goods in 
Argentina denominated in pesos. For simplicity we can consider the same 
basket of goods used in the construction of the Argentinian Consumer Price 
Index (CPIA). The CPI uses a market basket of goods, purchased by an average 
household during a specified period. The basket is determined by surveying the 
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quantity of different items purchased by different households. One can then 
determine, on an average, how many units of bread, milk, cheese, rent, 
electricity, etc. are purchased by a typical household. You might imagine it is 
as if all products are purchased in a grocery store, with items placed in a basket 
before purchasing is made. CBA then represents the peso cost of purchasing all 
of the items in the market basket. We shall similarly define CBB to be the cost 
of a market basket of goods in Brasil denominated in reais.  
Now if LOP holds for each individual item in the market basket, then it should 
hold for the market baskets as well. In other words,  
A
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Rewriting the right-hand side equation allows us to establish the relationship in 
a form commonly used to describe absolute purchasing power parity. Namely,  
A
CB
B
CB
AB
EPPP =
/  
If this condition holds between two countries then we would say PPP is 
satisfied. The condition says that the PPP exchange rate (reais per pesos) will 
equal the ratio of the costs of the two market baskets of goods denominated in 
local currency units. Note that the reciprocal relationship is also valid.    
A
CB
B
CB
BA
EPPP
=
/
 
The cost of a market basket of goods is used in the construction of the country's 
consumer price index, PPP is often written as a relationship between the 
exchange rate and the country's price indices.  
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3.2 Market Integration and Price Convergence 
The issue of price convergence in commodity markets both at national and 
international levels has been studied rather extensively in the literature either 
under the notion of the law of one price or under the notion of market 
integration. Moreover, reflecting on the market liberalization expansion and 
structural adjustment efforts undertaken by a number of developing countries in 
recent years, the degree to which markets are integrated has been used quite 
often as a yardstick in assessing the success of policy reforms.  
Many authors have cautioned, however, that price convergence does not 
necessarily imply the efficient allocation of resources unless the setting in 
which trade takes place is competitive. For example, consider the extreme case 
of two duopolies that agree to charge the same price in two segmented markets. 
While convergence in prices (whenever price changes occur) would take place 
instantaneously, the oligopolistic setting of the market may not necessarily 
allocate resources in the most efficient manner. In such cases, the law of one 
price holds by definition without necessarily implying that resources are 
allocated efficiently.  
In recent years, the analysis of market and regional integration has lead 
regional economists and economic historians to examine price convergence. 
Various definitions exist for market integration, but Roehner (1995) has 
reduced these to two alternative conceptions: In the first one, a region (or a 
market) is integrated if “enough” arbitragers are present in the markets, and if 
they are acting “efficiently” in a sense that supposes a number of conditions 
such as, for instance, the requirement of perfect information. In this conception, 
a market either is integrated or it is not; there is no room for a measure to 
reflect a certain degree of integration. In the second concept, the degree of 
market integration is identified with the level of inter-market price differentials 
(or some equivalent variable). If these differentials are large (in relative terms), 
then the market is poorly integrated. If, on the other hand, they are small, then 
the market would be well integrated. The first concept has its origin in financial 
markets, and one must examine whether this concept of an efficient market can 
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be transposed to commodity markets. If so, one should be able to give an 
operational meaning to the notion of perfect information. A clear operational 
criterion of an efficient market would consist of observing that price 
differentials do not exceed transactions and transport costs. While information 
on transactions costs is easily available in financial markets, this is not 
necessarily true for transportation costs in commodity markets.  
In contrast to financial markets where only a few parameters are required, a 
commodity contract involves many parameters such as quality of the product 
(within a given grade) and specifications regarding hoarding, transportation, 
loading and discharging, etc. Almost none of these parameters are usually made 
public.  
It is significant to state that by the LOP, if a country sells more cheaply than 
another, in a world without barriers, these prices will naturally converge into an 
identical price. When a FTA is created barriers like tariff reductions and scale 
economies in transportation, hoarding, communications, loading and 
discharging are achieved. In a real world, when a FTA is created, the price will 
not be converged into an identical value but a certain level of convergence is 
expected to be observed. 
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4. Methodology 
In this section a discussion about the collection of data and methods used to 
perform the study will be done. 
Recent empirical work in international economics has focused on the 
segmentation of markets. It has become increasingly clear that country markets 
are far from a perfect integration.  
Naturally, we have costs that may influence differences in prices such as 
transportation, communication and storage. In this study these costs will be 
reduced during the integration process resulting in another factor to explain a 
higher integration during the Mercosur. 
Previous studies used disaggregated data on consumer prices to explain the 
variability in prices in different countries and across U.S. cities. However, the 
idea of using these prices to find-out what happened with the price convergence 
among countries that belong to a FTA after a country-member crisis seems 
new. Previous studies like Parsley and Wei (1996) use prices rather than price 
indexes, and examine deviations from the (“absolute”) law of one price (LOP). 
Economists use two versions of LOP: absolute LOP and relative LOP. 
Absolute LOP refers to the equalization of price levels across countries. Put 
formally, the exchange rate between Brazil and Argentina EB/A is equal to the 
price level in Brazil PB divided by the price level in Argentina PA. Relative LOP 
refers to rates of changes of price levels, i.e., inflation rates. This proposition 
states that the rate of appreciation of a currency is equal to the difference in 
inflation rates between the foreign and the home country. For example, if Brazil 
has an inflation rate of 1% and Argentina has an inflation rate of 3%, the 
Argentinian Peso will depreciate against the Brazilian real by 2% per year. This 
proposition holds well empirically especially when the inflation differences are 
large. 
 In Empirical Results and Analysis, this thesis will replicate Engel and Rogers’  
(1999) international study with data from across Mercosur. Using data at the 
national level, Engel compared the prices of similar goods across countries to 
the relative price of different goods within a country, and found the former to, 
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generally speaking, be much more variable. This thesis asks whether the same 
is true across Mercosur in three different periods before the Mercosur, during 
the Mercosur and during the Argentinian crisis. Engel contends that nominal 
price stickiness might be one explanation for his results. In each country, prices 
are sticky in the consumers, currencies, but the nominal exchange rate is not 
sticky, so as it varies the common currency prices of the goods vary. However, 
previous studies such as Engel and Roger (1996) for data on prices for U.S. 
cities, where there was no nominal exchange rate variability found that sticky 
prices couldn’t be the explanation for his finding.  
There can be little doubt about the importance of FTAs to the integration of 
markets. Previous works, argued that the deviations from the law of one price 
are a prime suspect in the failure of absolute purchasing power parity (PPP). As 
seen in the theoretical framework there are four explanations for PPP not 
holding: (1) Barriers to trade such as tariffs and transportation costs; (2) 
Different consumption preferences across countries; (3) Presence of non-traded 
goods in consumer price indexes (CPIs); and (4) Prices that are sticky in terms 
of the currency in which the good is consumed, note that explanations (1) and 
(4) depend on deviations from the law of one price across countries, while 
explanations (2) and (3) imply significant relative price movements within a 
country. 
Engel (1993) examined the relative contributions of these two general 
explanations for the failure of PPP. To understand this approach in its simplest 
form, consider two goods, i and j, and two locations, A and B. Engel compares 
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In 1993, Engel studies computed volatility as the variance of the first-
differences (or, alternatively, 3rd, 6th, or 12th-differences) of the logs of 
monthly prices. He uses data for the G7 countries of four price indexes (the 
overall CPI and CPIs for food, shelter and services) and for consumer prices of 
33 narrowly defined categories of goods between the U.S. and Canada. With 
only a few exceptions, he finds 
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PV . Failures of the law 
of one price appear to be much more pronounced than the intra-country relative 
price changes that motivate some theories of real exchange rate movements.  
In this thesis Engel and Rogers’ analysis will be replicated on the disaggregated 
consumer prices for Mercosur countries. Define 
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 (Equation 1) 
Where sd is the standard deviation. 
The numerator of rkj in the equation above represents the average of the 
standard deviations of the first difference of the price of good j relative to the 
price of each different good in location k. So, the numerator measures the 
volatility of relative price of different goods in the same location. The 
denominator of rkj in the equation is the average standard deviation of the first 
difference of the price of good j in location k relative to the price of the same 
good in different locations. So, the denominator measures the volatility of 
deviations from the law of one price. A large value of rjk means that violations 
of the law of one price are large by Engel's measure. 
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4.1 How the thesis was conducted. 
After Mercosur creation an increase in trade happened. Observed indications of 
price reductions are consistent with tax reductions that occurred, with the 
exception of natural resources that had a tax elevation. The price reduction on 
export prices is also a result of cheaper importation of resources to produce 
goods domestically. 
The methodology will be applied in three stages of the Mercosur, the pre 
Mercosur period, the peak of Mercosur, and Mercosur after The Argentinian 
crisis. 
 
 
 
1) Pre Mercosur Stage 
As stated before in this stage before the FTA was established, the degree of 
integration was smaller. In the application of the data, we should get a higher 
divergence in prices between these countries.  
This study will be done during one year before Mercosur’s foundation from the 
period between March 1990 and February 1991. 
 
2) Mercosur’s Peak 
The second application of the data to calculate the relative prices between 
Mercosur countries will be done during the peak of this Free Trade Area. The 
main idea is to find during this period a good degree of convergence in prices 
between countries.  
Therefore, the second period of the thesis will be done using 1997’s data of 
prices from the period between January 1997 and December 1997. 
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3) Argentina Crisis Stage. 
The intention of this thesis is to explain what happened after the Argentinian 
crisis, what happened to all countries that belong to Mercosur. After the the 
Argentinian crisis the Mercosur almost collapsed, with a huge decrease in 
trade, and an increase in tariffs for imported goods between the FTA countries. 
This stage study will be done using data from the period between November 
2001 and October 2002. 
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5. Empirical results and Analysis 
In this part of the paper, an explanation of all calculations will be done. 
While explaining each important step of calculations, from the data that was 
collected to the final result that explains price convergence/divergence.  
 
5.1 Application of the relative price method. 
The data used are monthly prices for the four partners of the Mercosur 
(Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil) countries, starting in March 1990 
and ending in October 2002. For each country we have prices for 22 different 
goods. This data has a broad range of items, from construction to food, from 
gasoline to cleaning material, from agro products to electronics.  
The data collected came from the main statistic offices in each country, as 
follows: 
- Brazil – FIPE – Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas 
- Argentina – INDEC – Instituto Nacional de Estatísticas y Censos 
- Uruguay – INE – Instituto Nacional de Estatística 
- Paraguay – DGEEC – Direccion General de Estatística, Encuestas y 
Censos 
The data covers a little bit more than 12 years with no missing data in the time 
series. However, the data used is only for three years dispersed in the 12 years 
time series (see Section 4.2.1). 
After collecting historical prices and all prices transformed to the same unit 
(e.g. grams, liters, etc) and amount, they were all converted in United States 
dollars, by multiplying the price in time t by the dollar quotation in time t. In 
Appendix 2 a table containing the result of these calculations (for 1056 prices) 
for the Pre Mercosur stage, or when the Mercosur was not yet created is shown. 
One table for the Mercosur’s Peak stage and for the Argentina crisis stage was 
done in the same way. All items chosen to perform calculations are for tradable 
goods. With non-tradable goods, such as houses, some services were not 
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chosen because they have local characteristics and are not tradable between 
countries.After that step the log of each price was calculated. 
To find all rkjs the equation 1, above presented on the methodology section of 
this thesis, was used. By doing so, everything was ready to calculate the log 
first difference of price of good j at location k at time t. For all goods and 
location the ratio rkj was calculated. For each stage was calculated all rkjs and 
after that the standard deviation of all rkjs.  
Below, there is an itemized explanation for rkjs calculation is done: 
1. Table with prices (local currency). 
2. Transform those prices in USD (currency rate at time t). 
3. Calculate the LOG for each price. 
4. Make the first difference between each month. 
5. Calculations for the numerator: 
• Difference between one product j in relation to all 21 other 
products in one country. 
• Standard deviation of all results (21) divided by 21. 
6. Calculations for the denominator: 
• Difference between the same products in all different countries. 
• Standard deviation of all results divided by the number of 
countries. 
7. Divide Numerator by the denominator and than you have the rkj  - Ratio 
Each Country Relative Price Variability to Cross Country LOP Deviation. 
Table 1 reports the average of the rjk ratios (below) across locations for each 
goods item in different periods traded by the Mercosur. If these ratios were to 
conform to Engel's (1999) findings, they should generally be very small (what 
explain a high integration) – at least during the Mercosur best year (most 
integrated year). On each stage (pre Mercosur, Mercosur’s peak and after 
Argentina crisis) the same work had to be done to calculate the ‘Ratio of One 
Specific Country Relative Price Variability to Cross-Country LOP deviation’ 
(average ratio by good), this calculation has to be done for each country in each 
stage. So, four tables for each stage were done. Below an example of what was 
calculated regarding the ratio for Argentina – Stage 1 is presented (Table 1). 
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Table 1 - Ratio of Argentina Relative Price Variability to Cross Country LOP Deviation -
(Pre Mercosur Stage) 
             
Time 
Apr/
Mar 
May/ 
Apr 
Jun/
May
Jul/
Jun
Aug/
Jul 
Sep/
Aug
Oct/
Sep
Nov/ 
Oct 
Dec/ 
Nov 
Jan/ 
Dec 
Feb/ 
Jan Average
Good              
Wine  5,26 5,33 3,18 4,82 7,75 8,45 15,9 8,34 3,68 2,61 5,47 6,44 
Cheese 3,13 10,26 4,76 12,1 4,37 2,00 8,41 10,75 0,84 4,10 2,42 5,75 
S.Flower Oil 3,89 0,45 0,31 0,79 2,23 1,28 2,64 1,71 0,98 5,96 8,43 2,61 
Egg 2,06 1,01 1,00 5,44 17,4 18,4 8,22 3,45 0,88 6,46 3,47 6,17 
Honey 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,54 4,54 7,13 1,29 
Meat 5,82 4,85 1,62 10,3 5,98 1,60 1,97 14,79 3,47 3,49 6,19 5,46 
Energy 4,12 13,12 10,7 16,9 9,24 3,30 17,9 8,07 19,48 22,62 27,59 13,93 
Telephone 1,51 5,80 1,78 8,40 4,12 3,03 4,13 2,60 4,17 8,75 6,31 4,60 
Gasoline 2,09 3,53 2,66 15,0 5,08 2,13 7,01 8,06 1,16 3,23 2,34 4,76 
Bulb 100w 2,56 3,86 2,28 5,70 7,00 8,88 14,1 5,83 2,58 1,96 7,18 5,63 
Fridge 0,00 0,00 0,61 1,30 3,06 3,17 0,07 1,06 1,03 2,35 1,37 1,27 
Hotel 0,00 0,00 14,7 8,71 0,81 1,73 3,44 2,82 1,72 3,15 6,22 3,94 
Chicken 6,92 4,50 2,30 4,86 2,55 1,00 7,03 16,18 3,22 3,97 5,43 5,27 
Orange 1,76 15,45 14,6 19,2 8,02 6,26 14,6 6,08 3,47 5,39 4,55 9,05 
Tooth Paste 5,15 4,37 3,13 11,1 5,59 2,50 5,36 8,20 1,95 4,67 5,24 5,21 
Shampoo 5,54 11,82 8,30 8,61 7,46 7,96 16,7 8,07 3,14 3,86 4,70 7,84 
Chocolate 4,84 4,73 2,58 9,73 4,87 2,95 7,28 9,62 1,93 4,05 5,83 5,31 
Soap 4,39 13,18 6,35 0,69 3,94 9,19 10,9 7,59 3,90 4,12 4,50 6,25 
Fabric 2,69 4,41 8,99 58,7 43,3 28,2 3,51 14,05 4,25 2,38 0,96 15,60 
Paper 0,00 0,00 3,89 2,54 1,15 0,99 1,72 1,46 2,92 2,88 4,11 1,97 
T. Paper 5,54 11,20 9,06 11,6 8,20 9,50 12,7 4,75 2,29 5,71 3,88 7,68 
Coffee 2,92 3,68 2,11 14,7 7,46 4,58 7,32 8,78 1,08 3,68 4,61 5,55 
 
All rkjs average are now used to calculate a Ratio of Inter-Country Relative 
Price Variability to Cross Country LOP deviation, the Table 1 results (average) 
are now used in Table 2 (at the column named “Argentina”) where it is possible 
to see that which is the ratio of the first difference of the price of good j relative 
to the price of each different good in location k. This is presented as the ‘Ratio 
of Inter-Country Relative Price Variability to Cross-Country L.O.P. deviation’ 
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(Tables 2, 3 and 4). One table per stage will be calculated and these tables are 
shown bellow. The statistics reported in these tables are for the monthly 
differences in logs of price for the three different time series (years). The 
smaller the law-of-one-price deviations, the smaller should be the denominators 
of the rjk ratios. 
 
Table 2 - Ratio of Inter-Country Relative Price Variability to Cross Country LOP 
Deviation (Average Ratio, by Good) 
Pre Mercosur (March 1990 - February 1991) 
  Country Brazil Argentina Paraguay Uruguay 
Std. dev. of 
1st diff. 
Good       
Wine   5,43 6,44 4,39 10,94 6,80 
Cheese  2,95 5,75 4,18 5,79 4,67 
Sun Flower Oil  2,37 2,61 2,00 4,18 2,79 
Egg  5,50 6,17 0,25 0,00 2,98 
Honey  2,11 1,29 2,75 1,02 1,79 
Meat  5,28 5,46 4,32 7,46 5,63 
Energy  17,42 13,93 10,10 21,28 15,68 
Telephone  5,09 4,60 3,86 8,45 5,50 
Gasoline  3,34 4,76 3,49 6,80 4,60 
Bulb 100w  5,16 5,63 3,58 10,14 6,13 
Fridge  5,73 1,27 1,01 2,57 2,65 
Hotel  3,94 3,94 2,86 12,60 5,84 
Chicken  4,78 5,27 4,49 13,14 6,92 
Orange  6,57 9,05 6,16 8,76 7,63 
Tooth Paste  4,23 5,21 3,91 11,30 6,16 
Shampoo  6,56 7,84 5,39 12,04 7,96 
Chocolate  3,97 5,31 3,95 10,86 6,02 
Soap  6,34 6,25 4,55 10,25 6,85 
Fabric  20,32 15,60 13,82 38,28 22,00 
Paper  2,51 1,97 1,78 4,52 2,69 
T. Paper  6,53 7,68 5,25 12,68 8,04 
Coffee  3,63 5,55 3,86 6,19 4,81 
     
22 goods 
average 6.55 
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Table 3 - Ratio of Inter-Country Relative Price Variability to Cross Country LOP 
Deviation (Average Ratio, by Good) 
Mercosur’s Peak (January 1997 - December 1997) 
  Country Brazil Argentina Paraguay Uruguay 
Std. dev. of 
1st diff. 
Good       
Wine   0,82 1,32 1,14 1,14 1,11 
Cheese  2,02 3,32 2,64 1,82 2,45 
Sun Flower Oil  0,59 1,00 0,84 0,81 0,81 
Egg  0,88 1,11 1,26 1,00 1,06 
Honey  0,94 0,85 1,05 1,02 0,97 
Meat  0,82 1,07 0,93 1,11 0,98 
Energy  1,63 2,16 1,50 2,12 1,85 
Telephone  1,04 1,80 1,45 1,24 1,38 
Gasoline  1,03 1,21 1,06 1,42 1,18 
Bulb 100w  0,75 1,22 1,01 1,66 1,16 
Fridge  1,45 2,28 1,48 3,43 2,16 
Hotel  7,81 8,87 6,61 12,40 8,92 
Chicken  1,75 1,73 1,62 2,24 1,84 
Orange  1,54 3,23 2,02 1,77 2,14 
Tooth Paste  0,76 1,27 1,02 1,17 1,06 
Shampoo  0,61 1,07 0,94 0,68 0,83 
Chocolate  1,01 1,30 1,14 1,40 1,21 
Soap  1,03 1,29 1,11 1,38 1,20 
Fabric  1,27 2,25 1,56 2,47 1,89 
Paper  5,03 4,19 4,94 6,51 5,17 
T. Paper  0,83 1,57 1,10 1,34 1,21 
Coffee  1,98 2,82 2,59 2,25 2,41 
     
22 goods 
average 1.95 
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A number closer to 1 means a more integrated situation or fewer deviations on 
relative prices. In this thesis, for the pre Mercosur stage, we considering a 22 
goods items and four countries average of the first difference a standard 
Table 4 - Ratio of Inter-Country Relative Price Variability to Cross Country LOP 
Deviation (Average Ratio, by Good) 
Argentina Crisis (November 2001 - October 2002) 
  Country Brazil Argentina Paraguay Uruguay 
Std. dev. of 
1st diff. 
Good       
Wine   9,48 10,87 6,98 13,22 10,14 
Cheese  4,75 6,51 4,85 5,29 5,35 
Sun Flower Oil  1,25 1,38 0,80 1,49 9,29 
Egg  0,07 0,21 0,12 0,23 0,16 
Honey  1,31 1,12 0,74 1,42 1,15 
Meat  4,77 6,85 4,91 5,15 5,42 
Energy  4,08 4,30 2,90 6,20 4,37 
Telephone  13,10 13,91 8,57 17,58 13,29 
Gasoline  4,88 6,19 4,89 5,39 5,34 
Bulb 100w  8,26 9,41 5,41 15,04 9,53 
Fridge  5,04 5,90 3,94 8,63 5,88 
Hotel  15,68 13,50 8,15 28,05 16,35 
Chicken  6,61 7,05 4,98 8,57 6,80 
Orange  16,85 10,66 6,91 19,55 13,49 
Tooth Paste  9,61 10,94 6,94 12,35 9,96 
Shampoo  6,25 7,78 5,66 8,27 6,99 
Chocolate  9,40 12,01 7,53 12,67 10,40 
Soap  6,41 7,58 5,67 8,20 6,97 
Fabric  7,89 9,31 5,30 12,58 8,77 
Paper  5,11 5,88 3,71 10,65 6,34 
T. Paper  9,49 9,21 7,55 12,03 9,57 
Coffee  8,60 8,94 5,43 11,05 8,51 
     
22 goods 
average 7.54 
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deviation of 6.55, for the Mercosur’s peak 1.95 and for the Argentina crisis 
stage 7.54. However, we may observe that the result closest to one happened 
during the Mercosur’s peak. Before Mercosur, and after the Argentinian crisis, 
we had a similar results, 6.55 and 7.54.  
6.55 was a high value because Mercosur had not yet been created, the data used 
in this stage was from one year before the foundation of Mercosur (from Mar 
1990 to Feb 1991). 
During Mercosur peak some effects of the integration had already happened, 
there are few doubts that the integration that processed in Latin America 
brought benefits to all involved countries. The compromise of this system is 
essential to visualize trade gains. However these gains are not necessarily gains 
for all economic agents, there are losers in this process especially during the 
adjustment period that made some productive domestic sectors reduce their 
activities, and other sectors to increase. The idea of analysing this stage is to 
apply the relative price method after the adjustment period, when prices have 
more probability to be converged. This integration obtained during the period 
from January 1997 till December 1997 gives us the smallest value obtained in 
this analysis (1.95). 
After the Argentinian crisis there was a disintegration of all Mercosur’s 
partner’s economy.  In our study the result obtained 7.54 is bigger than the 6.53 
obtained for the pre Mercosur stage. 
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6. Summary and Concluding Remarks. 
Our study about integrations and relative prices drove us to the following 
conclusions that can be divided in two parts. 
First,  this work made some calculations in order to examine integration 
between countries. We may say that the Mercosur creation made all countries 
participants to achieve a much better degree of integration. As shown in Tables 
2, 3 and 4, the Ratio of Inter-Country Relative Price Variability to Cross 
Country LOP Deviation was 6.55 falling down to 1.95 during the Mercosur’s 
Peak. 
The main explanation for that are better conditions in transport, negotiation and 
reduction of tariffs. And another reasonable explanation may be that all sticky 
price goods during the Argentina Peak, had a similar variation because all 
countries had a similar relative quotation against the American dollar. 
Secondly, by proving that during the Mercosur integration occurred, a further 
analysis could be done, to check whether the impact of Argentina crisis 
affected Mercosur. And, as expected the Ratio of Inter-Country Relative Price 
Variability to Cross Country LOP Deviation Again increased to 7.54, proving 
that Argentina crisis was intense. Some pertinent articles from a very important 
newspaper in Brazil state some other facts that go into the disintegration 
process. Below, some sentences from these articles: 
“Brazil and Argentina are responsible for 90% of the volume of trade between 
countries of Mercosur. After The Argentinian crisis some polemic questions 
must be solved, like the non accomplishment of the automotive deal.” 
(Interview with the Brazilian Ambassador - José Botafogo Gonçalves). 
“Brasil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina are facing a joint crisis. These 
countries plan to re-establish basic principles of the Mercosur’s integration. 
Ministers from all Mercosur’s countries agree that the economic crisis affect 
with intensity financial & commercial flows and other production factors.” 
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“For the Brazilian sub secretary of Integration, Economy and External trade, 
the ambassador, Clodoaldo Hugueney, the External Common Tax, a tax used 
for imported goods among Mercosur is not being used equally among all 
partners and should be changed. For him, Mercosur is living at a very difficult 
time, with a trade reduction of 70% between Brazil, and Argentina the two 
more important partners of Mercosur”. 
“There are between 20 antidumping barriers against Brasil in the Mercosur said 
Sérgio Amaral the Brazilian Minister of development, Industry and External 
Trade” 
These articles contribute to this study because we may conclude that the degree 
of integration has declined, which means that prices diverged and the LOP 
increased, proving the impact of the Argentina crisis in the Mercosur which 
caused a lot of consequences to Mercosur’s partners, the free trade area of 
South America. Another reasonable explanation to this result is again sticky 
price goods that impacted much more after Argentina peso devaluation, and 
other currencies of the FTA floated a lot. Also, after this crisis an increase of 
import tariffs took place. 
The Ratio of Inter-Country Relative Price Variability to Cross Country LOP 
Deviation of 7.54 in relative prices show us that Mercosur (a FTA) bloc is not 
making it integration role. The impact of Argentina crisis on it FTA bloc was 
intense, and our result indicates that nowadays the integration of Argentina 
with Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay is almost the same as before Mercosur’s 
creation. 
When carrying out this study it’s not enough to look at prices alone or price 
indexes. It is important to use relative price to calculate prices convergence, 
and therefore observe economic integration. Engel and Roger method proved to 
be a good approach for this thesis’ empirical Section. 
A further step in the Argentina crisis analysis would be the economical 
consequences that the lack of economic integration resulted by the price 
divergence may bring. And, also how the economical recuperation of these 
countries after the crisis reflects on price convergence.  
 43  
References 
Cibils, Alan B., Mark Weisbrot, and Karl Debayani (2002) Argentina Since 
Default: The IMF and the Depression, Centre for Economics and Politic 
Research. 
 
Antweiler, Werner (1999) Purchasing Power Parity - Facts and Figures, 
University of British Columbia press. 
Baptista, Julio (2002) Brasil e Argentina discutem pontos polêmicos do 
Mercosul, O Estado de São Paulo, Friday July 05 2002. 
Bartholomew, Ed (1998) An Analysis of the Impact of Argentina membership 
of Mercosur, Universidade de São Paulo press, vr2, n.2.  
Basílio, Janofre (2002) Ministro pede fim de restrições a produtos brasileiros, 
O Estado de São Paulo Tuesday March 21 2002. 
Brandão, Antonio Salazar P. and Lia Valls Pereira (1997) Mercosul 
Perspectivas da Integração, Fundação Getulio Vargas. 
Bukenyas, James O. and Walter C. Labys (2002) Price Convergence in World 
Commodities Market: Fact or Fiction, West Virginia Universit, Research Paper 
2002-1. 
Engel, Charles and John H. Rogers (1999) Violating the law of one price: 
Should we make a case out of it?, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Working Paper 7242. 
Engel, Charles (1993) Real exchange rates and relative prices, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, American Economic Review (86). 
Espiel, Hector Gros (1991) Tratado de Assuncion y algumas questiones 
jurídicas que plantea, In Informacao Legislativa º 111. 
Florence, Paulo (2002) Governo FHC começa a ter dúvidas sobre o Mercosul, 
O Estado de São Paulo,  Saturday July 06 2002. 
 44  
Green, Edward J. and Rulin Zhou (2001) Price Level Uniformity in a Random 
Matching Model with Perfectly Patien Traders, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago, WP-2001-17 
O’Neill, Jim (2002) The World Cup and Economics, Goldman Sachs 
Publication. 
Filho, Joaquim (1999) Evidences from the GTAP model in the Mercosur 
Integration Process, The Denish Institute of Agricultural and Fisheries 
Economics. 
Krugman, Paul R. and Maurice Obstfeld (2000) International Economics: 
Theory and Policy, Makron Books. 
Laird, Sam (1997) Mercosur: Objectives and Achievements, World Trade 
Organization document. 
Mulligan, Mark (2002) Uruguay pays price for close regional ties, Financial 
Times, Thursday May 23 2002. 
Nóbrega, Ivan (2002) Crise enfraquece posição do Mercosul na Alca, O Estado 
de São Paulo, Monday April 29 2002. 
Nóbrega, Ivan (2002) Mercosul pretende reforçar política fiscal e monetária, O 
Estado de São Paulo, Wednesday July 04 2002. 
Olarreaga, Marcelo and Isidro Soloaga (1997) Endogenous Tariff Formation: 
the Case of Mercosur World Trade Organization.  
Roehner, M. Bertrand (1995) The Volatilities of Agricultural Versus Industrial  
Commodities: Understanding Their Magnitudes and Their Historical Trends St.  
Catherine's College. 
Wonnacott, Paul and Ronald Wonnacott (1994) Economia, Makron Books. 
Yeats, Alexander (1997) Does Mercosur's trade performance raise concerns 
about the effects of Regional Trade Arrangements? World Bank.  
 
 45  
Appendix 1. 
 
Relative prices and Supply 
Regarding to Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1994) the possibility production 
frontier shows us different combinations of goods that the economy may 
produce. Therefore, to determine what the economy will really produces, it is 
important to analyse prices. We need to know exactly the price of different 
items in the economy, in other words, the price of one good relative to another 
one. 
In one competitive economy, supply decisions are determined in such a way 
that individuals maximize their gains. Imagining a simplified economy, the 
work is the only production factor, and as an example we can imagine wine and 
cheese will be determined by the movement of workers to the industry that 
pays better. 
Let PQ e Pv be prices of cheese and wine, respectively. Its necessary aLQ hours 
of work to produce one kilogram of cheese (with no profit), the wages per hour 
in our cheese filed will be equal the value of what a worker produces in one 
hour, PQ/aLQ. 
Once aLV hours of work are necessary to produce one litter of wine, the wage 
hour relation will be equal to PV/aLV. Wages of the cheese sector are higher if 
PQ/PV>aLQ/aLV; and wine industry wages will be higher if PQ/PV<aLQ/aLV. 
However, all workers will want to work in the higher wages industry. So than 
the economy will be specialized in the cheese production if PQ/PV>aLQ/aLV; and 
will be specialized in wine production if PQ/PV<aLQ/aLV. Only when PQ /Pv it is 
equal to aLQ/aLV both goods will be produced. 
What is the meaning of the number aLQ/aLV? It is the opportunity cost of cheese 
relative to wine. By this we may conclude that the economy will be specialized 
in cheese production if the cheese relative price is higher than your opportunity 
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cost; and will be specialized in wine production if the relative price of the 
cheese is smaller than it’s opportunity cost. 
In the absence of international trade this country will be able to produce both 
goods for itself. However, the condition to produce both goods will only be if 
the relative price is exactly equal to the opportunity cost. 
Once the opportunity cost is equal to the relation between the necessity of 
working units to produce wine and cheese, we may summarize the 
determination of prices in the absence of international trade by a simple theory 
of working value: In the absence of international trade, goods’ relative prices 
are equal to its relative working units necessity.  
 
Trade in a world of one factor 
It is easy to describe effects of trade between two countries when each country 
has only one production factor. However, the implication of this analysis may 
be surprising, even for those who do not reflect concerninginternational trade. 
Many of these implications may be conflicting in a general sense. Even this 
simple trade model may present important orientations that we may apply in the 
real world topics, like the one that constitute the fair international competition 
and exchange rates. 
Before we talk about this topic, we may establish the model. Let’s imagine two 
countries, and let us determine one as local and the other one as foreign. Each 
of these countries has a production factor (work) and may produce two goods, 
wine and cheese. Like before we may determine the local working force as L 
and the necessity of local working units to produce wine and cheese as a*LQ 
and a*LV, respectively, and so on. 
Generally, the necessity of working unit may follow any pattern. As an 
example we may say that the domestic economy could be less productive than 
the foreigner in wine and more productive in cheese or the other way around. 
Let’s make an arbitrary supposition: 
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aLQ/aLV <a*LQ/a*LV 
or in another way: 
a*LQ/a*LV< aLQ/aLV 
In other words, we are stating that the proportion of units of work necessaries 
to produce one Kilogram of cheese, in relation to working units needed to 
produce one liter of wine, is smaller in the domestic economy than in the 
foreign. In general we may say that the relative productivity of cheese in the 
local country is higher than the wine one. 
However, the proportion of work required units it is equal to the cheese 
opportunity cost related to wine; also we must remember that we defined the 
comparative advantage precisely, in opportunity cost terms. Therefore, the 
supposition about relative productivity in equations, aLQ/aLV <a*LQ/a*LV  and  
a*LQ/a*LV< aLQ/aLV is the same thing as saying that the local economy has an 
comparative advantage in cheese production. 
Something must be considered at this point: the condition that the local 
economy has comparative advantages concerns all four working units’ 
necessities, and not only two. This could be understood when determining who 
will produce cheese. All that must be done is to compare the units of work 
necessities for  the cheese production, aLQ and a*LQ. If aLQ<a*LQ, the work in 
the local country is more efficient than in the foreign country in terms of cheese 
production. When a country may produce one good unit with less work than 
another country, we may say that the first country has absolute advantage in the 
production of this product. In our example, the local country has absolute 
advantage in the production of cheese. 
What we will now see is that we can’t determine the trade only by absolute 
advantage. One of the most common mistakes in international trade is to 
misunderstand comparative advantages and absolute advantages. 
Given working force and units of work necessaries on both countries, we may 
obtain the possibility frontier in the production of each country. In the graph 
below, we have PF as the possibility frontier of production in the domestic 
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economy. The production possibility frontier is shown as PF* in the graph 
below. Since the inclination of the production possibility frontier is equal to the 
cheese opportunity cost in terms of wine the country frontier is more sloped 
than the local nation. 
 
 
Foreigner production possibility frontier 
 
 
If we don’t have trade, relative prices of wine and cheese in each country 
would be determined by relative necessities of units of work. Therefore, in the 
domestic economy the relative price of cheese would be aLQ/aLV; and in the 
foreigner a*LQ/a*LV. 
Once the international trade possibilities are available, prices will not be 
determined only by domestic rules. If a relative price of cheese is higher in the 
foreigner economy than in the domestic one, it will be more profitable to export 
cheese from the domestic economy to the foreigner and to import wine from 
the foreigner to the domestic. It can’t happen indefinitely; the domestic 
economy will export the sufficient amount of cheese and the foreigner will 
Foreign production of cheese Q*Q,
in quilograms 
Foreign Production of wine, 
Q*V, in liters
L*/aLC
L*/aLV
-
+1
PF*
Since the necessity of the foreign units of work
is higher in relative terms than in the local
country, your possibility frontier is much more
sloped. 
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export sufficient wine in a way that relative prices will be equalized. Below we 
will find some explanation of what will define relative prices. 
 
How to determine relative prices after trade. 
Prices of internationally commercialised goods, like other prices, are 
determined by supply and demand. However, when we discuss comparative 
advantages, we must apply the demand and supply analysis carefully. If we 
analyse the trade politics, it is acceptable to analyse only supply and demand of 
only one economy. As one example we may say that: in the importation quotas 
of sugar in the United States of America it is acceptable to use partial 
equilibrium analysis, in other words, to study only one -  the trade of sugar. If 
we study comparative advantages, it is necessary to consider relations between 
different goods trade. Once the domestic economy export cheese only if import 
wine, and the other way around, it is wrong to analyse wine and cheese trade 
separately. It is necessary to analyse the general equilibrium that take under 
consideration connections between both markets. A useful way to consider both 
markets simultaneously is to highlight not only supplied and demanded 
quantity of cheese and wine, but the relative supply and demand, in other 
words, the number of kilograms of cheese supplied or demanded divided by the 
number of liters of wine supplied or demanded. 
Bellow, there is a presentation of the worldwide supply and demand of cheese 
in relation of wine as a function of the price of cheese in relation to the price of 
wine. RD is the relative demand and supply is RS. In worldwide general 
equilibrium the demand is relatively equal to the supply; therefore, the 
worldwide relative price will be determined by the intersection of RD and RS.   
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Worldwide relative Supply and demand 
 
The most notorious characteristic of the graph above is the curious stile o RS: 
it’s a “step” with connected straight sections connected by a verticals. Once we 
understand the derivation of RS we will almost understand the entire model. 
Firstly, like in the graph, RS slope show us that there is no supply of cheese if 
the worldwide price falls under aLQ/aLV. And this is because the domestic 
economy will be specialized in the wine production every time PQ/PV<aLQ/aLV. 
In the other hand, the foreigner economy will be specialized in the wine 
production every time PQ/PV<a*LQ/a*LV. As stated before, aLQ/aLV <a*LQ/a*LV, 
therefore, if cheese relative prices are under aLQ/aLV, there will be no world-
wide cheese production. 
Also, when the relative price of wine is exactly aLQ/aLV, we know that workers 
of the local country may receive the same amount if they produce cheese or 
wine. Therefore, the local country will like to supply any relative quantity of 
each good, making a horizontal section on the supply slope. 
Well, if PQ/PV is above aLQ/aLV the local country will be specialized on the 
cheese production. Since, PQ/PV<a*LQ/a*LV the foreign country will keep 
specialized in the production of wine. While the local country will be 
Relative quantity of cheese,
QQ+Q*Q/QV+Q*V
Relative prices of cheese,
PQ /Pv.
L*/aLQ
L*/a*LV
a*LQ/a*LV RS
aLQ/aLV
RD
RD’
1
2
Q’
RD show us that the demand for cheese in
relation to wine is a function the decrease of the
cheese price in relation to wine, wile RS show
us that the supply of cheese in relation to wine
is a function (of the same relative price) that
increases. 
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specialized in the cheese production, he will produce L/aLQ kilograms. 
Similarly, when the foreign country has a specialization in wine, it will produce 
L*/a*LV liters. Therefore, for any cheese relative price between aLQ/aLV and 
a*LQ/a*LV the relative cheese supply will be: 
(L/aLQ)/(L*/a*LV) 
When PQ/PV=a*LQ/a*LV, we know that foreigner workers will have no 
preference whether to produce wine or cheese. Therefore, we have another 
horizontal section of the supply slope. Finally, if PQ/PV<a*LQ/a*LV both 
economies will be specialized in the production of cheese. There will be no 
wine production and therefore we will have an infinite relative supply of 
cheese. 
The relative demand of RD does not need such an exhaustive analysis. The RD 
slope “going down” reflects the substitution effect. When the relative price 
goes up, consumers will buy less cheese and more wine, and the relative 
demand of cheese will fall. 
The relative equilibrium price of cheese is defined by the interception of both 
relative supply and demand slope. The world-wide relative demand and supply 
graph show a relative demand RD slope that crosses with RS in the point 1, 
where the cheese relative price is in between prices before trade between these 
countries. In this case, each country will be specialized in the production of the 
good that has a comparative advantage: the local country will produce only 
cheese and the foreign only wine. 
But this is not the only possible production. If the relevant RD slope was RD’, 
as an example, the relative supply and the demand would cross in one of the 
horizontal sections of RS. In the point 2, the world-wide relative price of 
cheese after trade is aLQ/aLV , the same as the opportunity cost of cheese in 
terms of wine in the local country. 
The meaning of this result is that if the relative price of cheese is equal to the 
opportunity cost of the local country, this one doesn’t need to specialize in the 
production of wine or cheese. In the point 2 the local country must be 
producing wine and cheese; we may get to this conclusion by the relative 
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supply of cheese (Q point in the horizontal axel) being smaller than if the local 
country was totally specialized. Once PQ/PV is below of the opportunity cost of 
wine in relation to wine in the foreign country, this one will be totally 
specialized in the wine production. However it still truth that if a country has an 
specialization, this one will be in the production of the good in which this 
country has comparative advantages. 
In this moment we should consider the possibility that one of both countries has 
no total specialization. Except in this case, the common result of the trade is 
that price of a commercialised good (cheese as an example) in relation to the 
price of another good (wine) will be a point in between their level before and 
after trade the trade involving both countries. 
The effect of this relative prices convergence is that each country will be 
specialized in the production of the good that needs less units of work. One 
increase in the cheese relative price in the local country makes the country 
specialized in cheese. The fall of the cheese price will make this country be 
specialized in wine. 
 
Production possibilities and relative supply 
Let us again assume two different goods, food (F) and clothes (C), and that any 
production possibility frontier is one soft slope, like the one shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
Relative prices determine the economy production 
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The point over the possibility frontier in which the economy really produces 
will depend on the price of clothes in relation with food price, PC/PF. As the 
microeconomic basic proposition states, the market economy that is not 
distorted by a monopoly or by market fails is efficient in production, which 
means that given market prices the production value is maximized, 
PCQC+PFQF. 
We may demonstrate the production market value by drawing the number of 
isovalue lines, which is to say, lines in which the production value is constant. 
Each one of these lines is defined by a equation PCQC+PFQF=V or QF= V/PF-
(PC/PF) QC, in which V is the production value. The higher is V, more apart the 
isovalue line will be; so, lines that are away from the origin will mean more 
expensive production values. 
The economy will produce the higher possible production value; this will 
happen if we produce in the Q point in which TT is exactly the tangent isovalue 
line. 
Now let’s imagine that PC/PF increases. Than the isovalue lines would be more 
steeped than before. In the graph below the most raised isovalue line that the 
economy could get before the change in PC/PF is shown as VV1, the most 
steeped line after the price change is VV2 and the point in which the economy 
Clothes production,
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One economy where the production possibility
frontier is TT will produce in Q, that is in the
higher isovalue line. 
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produces will move from Q1 to Q2. Therefore, a increase in the relative price of 
clothes will drive the economy to produce more clothes and less food. The 
relative supply of clothes will increase when the relative price of clothes 
increases. 
 
How an increase in the relative price of clothes affects the relative supply 
 
3.2.1 Relative Prices and Supply 
The graph below is a representation of the relation between the production, 
consume and the trade in the general model. 
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The isovalue will be more steep, when the
relative price of clothes increases from (PC/PF)1
to  (PC/PF)2 (like shown by the rotation from
VV1 to VV2). As a result, the economy produces
more clothes and less food. The equilibrium
product will move from Q1 to Q2. 
 55  
Production, consume and the trade as a general model 
 
As definition the value of economic consumption is equal to your production 
value: 
PCQC+PFQF= PCDC+PFDF=V 
Where, DC and DF are consumption of clothes and food, respectively. The 
above equation indicates that production and consumption must stay at the 
same isovalue line. 
The economic option for one pint in the isovalue line depends on the 
consumers’ preference. For our model in general, we make an easy and 
simplified supposition: Consumption decisions may be represented as if they 
were based on one representative individual’s preference. 
An individual preference may be graphically demonstrated as a indifference 
slopes series. One indifference slope is a representation of consumption of 
clothes C and food F, which maintain the individual equally in a good situation. 
These slopes have three proprieties: 
1. They are steep down: if a individual has an offer of less than F, than if he 
wants to be in an equally good situation, he got to receive more of C. 
Clothes production,
QC
Q
Indiferences 
slopes
Food Production, QF
D
Clothes 
Exportation
Isovalue Line
Food 
importation
The economy produces in Q, where the 
production possibility frontier is the higher 
indifference slope’s tangent. Consume will be 
at point D where the isovalue line is the higher 
indifference slope’s tangent. The economy 
produces more clothes than consumption, 
therefore export clothes. In the same way 
consume of food is higher than the production, 
therefore needs to import food. 
 56  
2. The more on the top and to the right side an indifference slope is, the 
higher is the satisfaction level: An individual will prefer more of both good for 
less. 
3. The indifference slope will be straighter as we move to the right: The 
more of C and less of F is the individual’s consumption the more valuable a 
unit of F will be, in the T unit margin comparison. So, more C will be supplied 
to compensate any reduction after F. 
In the graph above we show an indifference slope series for an economy that 
has these 3 properties. The economy will make an option for the point in the 
isovalue line that has these 3 properties. The economy will choose to consume 
in a point over the isovalue line. This pint will be where the isovalue line is a 
tangent in relation to the higher indifference slope in D. In this point the 
economy will export clothes (the clothes quantity is higher than the 
consumption of clothes) and import food. 
Now let’s consider what happens when PC/PF increases. Firstly, the economy 
will produce more C and less F and will move the production from Q1 to Q2.. 
This will move the isovalue line; in which the consumption must be from VV1 
to VV2. Finally, the consumption economy will also move from D1 to D2. 
The movement from D1 to D2 will affect two increases of PC/PF. Firstly, the 
economy moved to a higher indifference slope: in a better situation, all because 
this economy is a clothes exporter. When the relative price of clothes increases, 
the economy may import more food for any given volume of exportation. 
Therefore, the higher relative price of your exportation good is an advantage. 
Secondly, the change in relative prices will result in a dislocation through the 
indifference slope in the direction of food, leaving clothes. 
Both effects are familiar to the basic economy theory. The improvement of the 
welfare is a wealth effect; while the dislocation of consumption to any given 
welfare level is a substitution effect. The wealth effect will increase the 
consumption of both goods, while the substitution effect will move the 
economy to consume less C and more F. 
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In the beginning it is possible that the wealth effect is not so strong, that when 
PC/PF  increases both goods consumption really increases. However the 
proportion of C consumption and F consumption will fall, which is to say that 
the relative supply of C will fall, as shown below: 
 
Effects of an increase in clothes relative prices 
 
Determination of relative prices 
Let’s imagine that the global economy consist in two countries, with the same 
denomination, local (export clothes) and foreign (export food). The change 
terms of the local country are measured by PC/PF . QF and QC are quantity of 
clothes and food produced by the local economy: Q*F and Q*C are quantities 
produced abroad. 
To determine PC/PF, we find the intersection of the worldwide relative supply 
of clothes and your worldwide relative demand. The worldwide relative supply 
(RS) has an inclination to the top, because a n increase in PC/PF will make both 
countries to produce more clothes and less food. The worldwide relative 
demand slope (RD) is inclined to the bottom because an increase in PC/PF will 
make both countries move the clothes consumption to the food consumption 
Clothes production,
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TT
Food Production, QF
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The isovalue inclination is equal to clothes 
negative relative price PC/PF, therefore when 
the relative price increases, all isovalue lines 
will get a steeper. Particularly, the maximum 
value line will move from VV1 to VV2. The 
production will move from Q1 to Q2., 
consumption will also move from D1 to D2.. 
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direction. Below, it is possible to see the intersection of slopes (point 1), where 
the relative price equilibrium is defined (PC/PF)1. 
 
 
Worldwide relative supply and demand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RD
RS
(PC/PF)1
Relative prices of clothes,
PC/PF.
Relative quantity of 
clothes, QC+Q*C/QF+Q*F
The higher PC/PF is, the higher the world-wide
clothes relative supply (RS) will be and the
world-wide clothes demand will be smaller in
relation to the food world-wide demand (RD).
The relative equilibrium ((PC/PF)1) is
determined by the interSection of relative
world-wide supply and demand. 
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Appendix 2.   
Table A1 – Prices in USD – Period 1 
RGENTINA Wine Cheese S. Flower Oil Eggs Honey Meat Energy Telephone Gas Bulb Fridge
Year Month
1990 MAR 0,30 5,29 0,89 1,65 0,45 1,51 5,29 0,06 1,46 2,12 163,65
1990 APR 0,44 4,44 1,29 1,67 0,49 1,07 8,18 0,06 1,34 3,08 238,13
1990 MAY 0,49 4,06 1,43 1,48 0,54 1,19 7,39 0,07 1,42 3,41 263,14
1990 JUN 0,53 3,75 1,54 1,31 0,59 1,14 6,47 0,06 1,24 3,67 283,53
1990 JUL 0,59 3,43 1,73 1,36 0,64 1,07 5,51 0,06 1,13 4,14 319,47
1990 AUG 0,58 3,70 1,70 2,21 0,70 1,05 7,05 0,06 1,22 4,05 313,00
1990 SEP 0,70 3,61 2,03 1,45 0,77 1,40 4,96 0,06 1,19 4,85 374,85
1990 OCT 0,84 2,97 2,44 1,19 0,84 1,14 4,62 0,06 1,06 5,83 450,46
1990 NOV 0,95 2,97 2,78 0,84 0,92 0,97 3,98 0,09 1,15 6,64 513,00
1990 DEC 1,04 2,38 3,05 0,63 1,00 0,67 3,66 0,08 0,95 7,28 562,28
1991 JAN 0,86 2,50 2,52 0,81 0,64 0,77 0,81 0,12 0,91 6,01 464,13
1991 FEB 0,64 2,73 1,88 0,88 0,69 0,98 1,08 0,13 1,00 4,48 345,70
BRAZIL
1990 MAR 1,04 10,46 0,36 1,38 0,41 2,96 11,49 0,11 2,72 0,65 196,38
1990 APR 0,95 10,00 0,39 1,20 0,45 2,36 15,46 0,13 2,80 0,77 285,76
1990 MAY 0,98 7,98 0,43 1,10 0,49 2,32 14,35 0,13 2,60 0,79 315,77
1990 JUN 1,16 7,77 0,47 1,02 0,54 2,34 12,98 0,13 2,35 0,81 340,23
1990 JUL 1,10 7,10 0,51 1,13 0,59 2,18 11,48 0,13 2,08 0,79 383,37
1990 AUG 1,16 7,70 0,56 1,36 0,65 2,15 11,05 0,13 2,25 0,79 375,60
1990 SEP 1,04 7,59 0,61 1,14 0,71 2,94 9,41 0,13 2,19 0,79 449,82
1990 OCT 0,87 6,52 0,67 0,88 0,77 2,49 8,07 0,14 1,98 0,74 540,55
1990 NOV 0,70 5,56 0,73 0,61 0,85 1,79 6,52 0,16 1,86 0,62 615,60
1990 DEC 0,61 5,14 0,80 0,54 0,92 1,39 6,66 0,19 1,66 0,56 674,74
1991 JAN 0,55 4,77 0,51 0,64 0,59 1,44 0,60 0,23 1,51 0,53 556,96
1991 FEB 0,60 5,23 0,55 0,72 0,64 1,86 1,11 0,26 1,68 0,56 414,84
ARAGUAY
1990 MAR 0,86 11,81 0,37 1,15 0,24 3,34 9,54 0,13 3,07 0,54 114,55
1990 APR 1,10 8,60 0,48 1,38 0,26 2,03 17,78 0,11 2,41 0,89 166,69
1990 MAY 1,05 8,94 0,53 1,18 0,29 2,59 15,35 0,15 2,91 0,85 184,20
1990 JUN 1,13 7,77 0,58 0,99 0,32 2,34 12,59 0,13 2,35 0,79 198,47
1990 JUL 0,94 7,03 0,64 0,96 0,34 2,16 9,76 0,13 2,06 0,67 223,63
1990 AUG 1,73 7,54 0,66 2,04 0,38 2,11 16,58 0,13 2,21 1,19 219,10
1990 SEP 1,00 7,21 0,76 1,10 0,41 2,79 9,03 0,13 2,08 0,76 262,39
1990 OCT 0,93 5,48 0,88 0,94 0,45 2,09 8,63 0,11 1,67 0,79 315,32
1990 NOV 0,77 6,34 0,99 0,67 0,49 2,04 7,17 0,18 2,12 0,68 359,10
1990 DEC 0,49 4,16 1,08 0,43 0,54 1,13 5,33 0,15 1,34 0,45 393,60
1991 JAN 0,51 5,39 0,82 0,60 0,34 1,63 0,55 0,26 1,70 0,49 324,89
1991 FEB 0,54 5,86 0,69 0,64 0,37 2,09 0,99 0,29 1,88 0,50 241,99
URUGUAY
1990 MAR 0,37 0,40 0,36 0,89 0,34 0,16 1,65 0,01 0,48 0,77 212,74
1990 APR 0,40 0,44 0,39 0,90 0,38 0,18 1,80 0,01 0,52 1,11 309,57
1990 MAY 0,44 0,48 0,43 0,80 0,41 0,19 1,97 0,01 0,57 1,18 342,08
1990 JUN 0,48 0,53 0,47 0,70 0,45 0,21 2,15 0,01 0,62 1,23 368,58
1990 JUL 0,52 0,58 0,51 0,73 0,49 0,23 2,36 0,01 0,68 1,31 415,32
1990 AUG 0,57 0,63 0,56 1,19 0,54 0,25 2,58 0,01 0,74 1,41 406,90
1990 SEP 0,63 0,69 0,61 0,78 0,59 0,27 2,82 0,02 0,81 1,49 487,30
1990 OCT 0,68 0,75 0,67 0,64 0,64 0,30 3,08 0,02 0,89 1,72 585,59
1990 NOV 0,75 0,83 0,73 0,45 0,70 0,33 3,37 0,02 0,97 1,85 666,89
1990 DEC 0,82 0,90 0,80 0,34 0,77 0,36 3,68 0,02 1,06 1,94 730,96
1991 JAN 0,52 0,57 0,51 0,44 0,49 0,23 2,34 0,01 0,68 1,64 603,37
1991 FEB 0,56 0,62 0,55 0,48 0,53 0,25 2,54 0,01 0,73 1,29 449,42  
ARG 
P RAGUAY 
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RGENTINA
Year Month
1990 MAR
1990 APR
1990 MAY
1990 JUN
1990 JUL
1990 AUG
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1990 MAR
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1990 JUN
1990 JUL
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1990 MAR
1990 APR
1990 MAY
1990 JUN
1990 JUL
1990 AUG
1990 SEP
1990 OCT
1990 NOV
1990 DEC
1991 JAN
1991 FEB
Hotel Chicken Orange Tooth Paste Shampoo Chocolate Soap Fabric Paper Towel P. Coffe
42,90 1,53 0,19 0,41 0,09 1,09 0,08 0,13 1,14 0,28 0,69
49,84 2,22 0,23 0,60 0,13 1,59 0,12 0,14 1,26 0,41 0,59
56,92 2,46 0,20 0,67 0,15 1,75 0,13 0,15 1,06 0,45 0,63
39,85 2,65 0,16 0,72 0,16 1,89 0,14 0,17 1,05 0,49 0,56
37,60 2,98 0,14 0,81 0,18 2,13 0,16 0,18 1,14 0,55 0,51
36,81 2,92 0,19 0,79 0,18 2,08 0,15 0,20 1,17 0,54 0,50
32,32 3,50 0,15 0,95 0,21 2,50 0,18 0,22 1,13 0,65 0,48
33,78 4,21 0,14 1,14 0,25 3,00 0,22 0,24 1,00 0,78 0,44
30,65 4,79 0,13 1,30 0,29 3,42 0,25 0,26 0,83 0,88 0,46
33,02 5,25 0,11 1,43 0,32 3,74 0,28 0,29 0,98 0,97 0,39
24,36 4,33 0,12 1,18 0,26 3,09 0,23 0,18 0,82 0,80 0,38
28,69 3,23 0,15 0,88 0,19 2,30 0,17 0,20 0,93 0,60 0,45
35,75 2,09 0,43 0,62 0,91 0,69 0,25 3,13 0,95 1,04 1,26
41,53 1,65 0,44 0,57 0,81 0,66 0,25 2,78 1,05 0,93 1,19
47,43 1,55 0,40 0,55 0,74 0,61 0,22 2,75 0,88 0,85 1,13
33,21 1,52 0,32 0,52 0,71 0,59 0,26 3,90 0,88 0,78 1,02
31,34 1,92 0,29 0,47 0,69 0,56 0,30 0,52 0,95 0,71 0,91
30,68 2,08 0,31 0,54 0,70 0,61 0,31 3,55 0,98 0,79 0,87
26,93 2,41 0,30 0,54 0,62 0,59 0,34 3,78 0,94 0,78 0,81
28,15 1,95 0,27 0,51 0,50 0,51 0,31 3,58 0,84 0,71 0,75
25,54 1,27 0,24 0,45 0,42 0,46 0,25 2,27 0,69 0,65 0,66
27,52 1,12 0,21 0,43 0,38 0,43 0,21 2,05 0,82 0,62 0,58
20,30 1,25 0,25 0,49 0,40 0,45 0,24 1,71 0,68 0,80 0,58
23,91 1,40 0,31 0,54 0,44 0,54 0,27 1,72 0,78 0,81 0,71
25,02 2,36 0,35 0,70 0,75 0,78 0,20 3,53 0,95 0,86 1,42
29,07 1,42 0,50 0,49 0,94 0,57 0,29 2,39 1,05 1,07 1,03
33,20 1,74 0,42 0,62 0,79 0,69 0,24 3,08 0,88 0,91 1,26
23,25 1,52 0,31 0,52 0,69 0,59 0,25 3,90 0,88 0,75 1,02
21,93 1,90 0,25 0,47 0,59 0,55 0,25 0,51 0,95 0,60 0,90
21,47 2,04 0,47 0,53 1,05 0,60 0,47 3,47 0,98 1,18 0,85
18,85 2,29 0,29 0,52 0,60 0,56 0,33 3,59 0,94 0,75 0,77
19,71 1,64 0,29 0,43 0,54 0,43 0,34 3,01 0,84 0,76 0,63
17,88 1,44 0,26 0,52 0,46 0,52 0,27 2,58 0,69 0,72 0,75
19,26 0,90 0,17 0,35 0,31 0,35 0,17 1,66 0,82 0,49 0,47
14,21 1,41 0,23 0,56 0,37 0,51 0,23 1,94 0,68 0,74 0,66
16,74 1,57 0,27 0,60 0,39 0,60 0,24 1,93 0,78 0,72 0,79
46,47 0,11 0,03 0,15 0,37 0,13 0,10 0,13 1,23 0,09 0,27
53,99 0,12 0,04 0,16 0,40 0,14 0,11 0,14 1,36 0,10 0,29
61,66 0,13 0,04 0,18 0,44 0,15 0,12 0,15 1,15 0,11 0,32
43,17 0,14 0,04 0,19 0,48 0,17 0,13 0,17 1,14 0,12 0,35
40,74 0,16 0,05 0,21 0,52 0,18 0,15 0,18 1,24 0,13 0,38
39,88 0,17 0,05 0,23 0,57 0,20 0,16 0,20 1,27 0,14 0,42
35,01 0,19 0,06 0,25 0,63 0,22 0,18 0,22 1,22 0,15 0,46
36,60 0,21 0,06 0,27 0,68 0,24 0,19 0,24 1,09 0,17 0,50
33,21 0,23 0,07 0,30 0,75 0,26 0,21 0,26 0,90 0,18 0,55
35,77 0,25 0,07 0,33 0,82 0,29 0,23 0,29 1,06 0,20 0,60
26,39 0,16 0,05 0,21 0,52 0,18 0,15 0,18 0,89 0,13 0,38
31,08 0,17 0,05 0,23 0,56 0,20 0,16 0,20 1,01 0,14 0,41  
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